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Abstract 
This paper extends the standard New Keynesian model to allow for the presence of 
large banks, when the cost channel of monetary policy matters. It is shown that once 
the presence of large banks is taken into account the severity of the firms’ credit 
constraints, the aggressiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation and the 
degree of loan setting centralization jointly affect the steady state output. Moreover, 
it turns out that the indeterminacy region is not only shrunk due to the presence of a 
finite number of large banks but also dependent – among others - on the way in which 
the central bank and the macroprudential authority systematically behave.  
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Introduction 
There is a well-documented existence of imperfect competition in banking (Claessens 
and Laeven, 2004; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; De Bandt and Davis 2000). Moreover, Kim, 
Kristiansen, and Vale (2005), Northcott (2004), and Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), among 
others, provide evidence on product differentiation as one source of market power in 
banking. However, hinging on atomistic banks the New Keynesian model disregard the 
fact that banking interest rates are decided by few large banks whose decisions affect 
the aggregate banking interest rate at the national level. These large banks internalize 
the aggregate effects of their interest rate setting decisions by taking into account -
among others- the macroeconomic authorities’ decisions. This paper attempts to fill in 
this gap.        
 A second branch of literature focuses on macroprudential policy. The objective 
of this policy is to curtail macroeconomic costs associated with financial instability. A 
set of new macroprudential policies attempt to both strengthen regulatory constraints 
on bank leverage and balance sheets and also make such regulation more responsive 
to cyclical developments. The implications of these regulatory developments both for 
the banking sector and the whole economy are of great importance and large banks 
are expected to have a significant role to play.              
Third, the cost channel of monetary policy assigns banks a pivotal role in the 
transmission of monetary policy (Barth and Ramey, 2001; Ravenna and Walsh, 2006). 
According to this channel marginal production costs – apart from real wage - are also 
directly affected by interest rates, relating firms’ price decisions to credit conditions. 
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Barth and Ramey (2001) maintain that this supply effect of monetary policy dominates 
the traditional demand effect, i.e. the interest rate channel. Moreover, for its empirical 
relevance, see for the U.S., Barth and Ramey (2001), for Europe Dedola and Lippi 
(2005), and for the euro area, Fabiani et al. (2006). It’s worth noticing that under a cost 
channel, the New Keynesian model is more prone to interdeterminacy issues. Bruckner 
and Schabert (2003), Surico (2008) and Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) 
postulate that the cost channel introduces an additional upper bound to the inflation 
reaction in the Taylor rule. Hence, the question arises as to whether the concentrated 
bank sector - through large banks’ internalization effect - impacts on the conditions 
that guarantee equilibrium determinacy in a standard sticky price model augmented 
with a cost channel.   
Earlier contributions on monetary policymaking do not investigate these three 
branches simultaneously. The main novelty of the present paper is to embed all of them 
within a single microfounded framework. Hence, taking the aforementioned 
considerations into account, I extent the basic Νew Keynesian model to include three 
features:  
First, I introduce large (or non-atomistic) banks in the spirit of the large union 
literature (Lippi, 2003; Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999; Soskice and Iversen, 2000; Gnocchi, 
2009; Cuciniello, 2011; and Coricelli et al., 2006) into a New Keynesian DSGE model1. 
Large banks are a key assumption. These banks by providing differentiated loan 
services to firms they internalize the aggregate effects of their loan-setting decisions. 
This feature—which I refer to as banks’ internalization effect—is meant to capture the 
documented existence of loan mark-ups in credit markets. 
Second, regulatory capital requirements enter through a quadratic adjustment 
cost on bank leverage, which includes a time-variant capital adequacy rule. This 
allowance for bank capital requirements to be countercyclical (Angelini et al. , 2011; 
Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2013; and Hollander, 2017) reflects Basel III requirements. 
Combining this modeling choice with the hypothesis of large banks, gives us the 
opportunity to incorporate macroprudential concerns of an independent 
macroprudential authority that in our model large banks take into account. With the 
global financial crisis spreading to the real economy, I believe that this is an interesting 
area for further research. 
Third, I assume that firms need to pay wages in advance of production, which 
generates a need for external finance. In this way, financial market conditions matter 
for macroeconomic outcomes because they affect firms’ marginal costs. This is the cost 
channel of monetary policy, first introduced by Walsh and Ravenna (2006) and enriched 
by Airaudo and Pia Olivero (2019), Hülsewig et al. (2009) and others. The choice of the 
cost channel of monetary policy not only best serves the purpose of revealing the 
significance of large banks but also is a necessary assumption that is dictated by its 
empirical relevance. 
 
1 To our best knowledge, there is only one article that incorporate large banks into DSGE models of 
monetary policy, i.e., Cuciniello and  Signioretti (2015). Yet, it does not examine the implications of the 
interactions of large banks with the macroprudential authority, whereas it focuses on the traditional 
demand channel of monetary policy. Furthermore, it does not examine the stability properties of the 




Hinging on these three extensions, this paper adds to the literature, by revealing 
the importance of interactions between large banks, the monetary authority and the 
macroprudential authority - when the cost channel of monetary policy matters - for the 
analysis of monetary policy, in terms of the steady state of the economy and the 
stability properties of simple interest rate rules.  It is shown that a banking sector 
featuring aggressive large banks reduce the indeterminacy region and impacts on the 
steady state of the economy.  Hence, the paper reveals the role of the bank lending 
channel – when large banks internalize the consequences of their actions (interest rate 
setting) for the economic variables - in business cycle stabilization.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 
model giving emphasis on the banking sector of the economy. Then the baseline 
parameterization is presented in Section 2. Section 3 studies the steady state 
implications of the interactions between large banks, monetary policy and 
macroprudential authority, while Section 4 discusses the impact on the determinacy of 
the rational expectations equilibrium. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. The model 
I closely follow Airaudo and Pia Olivero’s DSGE model (2019) with a cost channel 
of monetary policy but without the borrowers’ bank-specific deep habits hypothesis. 
The closed economy consists of four different sectors: a household sector, a production 
sector composed of manufacturing and retail firms, a banking sector, a monetary 
authority and a macroprudential authority. Households take consumption-saving and 
labor-leisure decisions to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Monopolistically 
competitive retail firms subject to Calvo-type nominal rigidities produce final 
consumption goods using intermediate goods. Banks use households’ savings to 
provide loans in a monopolistically competitive market. Manufacturing firms produce 
intermediate goods with labor as the only input. These firms use a composite of 
imperfectly substitutable heterogeneous loans provided by a mass one continuum of 
banks, 𝐵𝑡(𝑗), to finance working capital needs (a fraction of the wage bill has to be paid 
at the beginning of the period before sales revenues are realized). So, each firm 
borrows from all banks. The working capital requirement is given by 𝛣𝑡(𝑗) = 𝑎𝑊𝑡𝑟𝛨𝑡                                                                                                                      (1) 
where 𝑎 denotes the credit distortion (or the share of the wage bill to be paid in advance).  
Households, retail and manufacturing firms’ optimizing problems are identical to those 
of Airaudo and Pia Olivero’s model (2019), so there are not reproduced here. The main 
differences with respect to the standard framework are in the structure of the banking 
sector.  
 
Macroprudential and Monetary Authority  
 
The macroprudential authority seeks to counter the build-up of risks during upswings 
and attenuate credit contraction and excessive risk-aversion in downturns in order to 
limit the accumulation of financial risks. In doing so, the macroprudential authority 
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adjust its policy instruments dynamically. I follow the Basel III reform and I introduce a 
countercyclical capital buffer; capital requirements increase in good times (banks must 
hold more capital for a given amount of loans) and decrease in recessions. Hence, for 
capital requirements the rule is (Angelini et al., 2011; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2013; and 
Hollander, 2017). 
 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉 (𝑌𝑡𝑌 )𝜒𝑣                                                                                                                          (2) 
 
where 𝜒𝑣   denotes the degree of countercyclicality of the capital buffer. On the other 
hand, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate, reacting to endogenous 
variations in inflation according to the following policy rule.  The parameter 𝜑𝜋 
indicates the aggressiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation.  
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅 (𝛱𝑡𝛱 )𝜑𝜋                                                                                                             (3) 
 
1.2 Banking sector with large banks  
 
The economy is populated by a finite number of banks indexed by 𝑥 where 𝑥𝜖(1 … 𝑧), 𝑧 ≥ 2. Thus, 𝑧−1 represents the degree of central interest rate setting or 
bank’s ability to internalize the general equilibrium consequences of its interest rate 
decision to the aggregate variables. Note that 1 < 𝑧 < ∞ corresponds to the case of 
large banks, while 𝑧 → ∞  to atomistic banks (where there is no internalization effect). 
Because of 1 < 𝑧 < ∞ the representative bank anticipates that  
 𝑑𝑅𝑡𝑏𝑑𝑅𝑡𝑏(𝑥) = 1𝑧                                                                                                               (4)      
 
Following Benes and Lees (2007) and Gerali et al. (2010) I model market power 
in the banking industry assuming a Dixit-Stiglitz framework for the loan market, 
whereas the deposit market is perfectly competitive (i.e., the interest rate on deposits 
equals the policy rate 𝑅𝑡). Accordingly, the loan demand schedule is given by 
 𝐵𝑡(𝑗) =  [𝑅𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝑅𝑡𝑏 ]−𝜀𝑏 𝐵𝑡                                                                                              (5)   
 
where 𝑅𝑡𝑏(𝑗) denotes the nominal loan rate of type 𝑗 ∈ 𝑥,  𝑅𝑡𝑏 is the nominal loan rate 
index defined as 𝑅𝑡𝑏 = [∫ 𝑅𝑡𝑏(𝑥)1−𝜀𝑏𝑑𝑥10 ]1/(1−𝜀𝑏) and 𝜀𝑏 is the elasticity of substitution 
among varieties of loans (market power in banking). 
Banks also have to obey a balance sheet identity equating loans 𝐵𝑡(𝑗) to 
deposits 𝐷𝑡(𝑗) and bank’s capital 𝐾𝑡𝑏(𝑗) (there is no reserve requirement). As in Gerali 
et al. (2010) bank’s capital is accumulated out of retained earnings. 
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𝐵𝑡(𝑗)=𝐷𝑡(𝑗) + 𝐾𝑡𝑏(j)                                                                                                                         (6) 
 
In our setting, large banks maximize the discounted sum of their profits consist 
of the net interest margin (loan minus deposit interest payments) minus the quadratic 
cost that the bank is assumed to pay for deviating from its target leverage. The 
introduction of a time varying target of leverage Vt set by the Macroprudential 
Authority is in line with Angelini et al. (2011) and Paries et al. (2010). 
 
max 𝐸0 {∑ 𝛬0,𝑡𝑃∞𝑡=0 [𝑅𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝐵𝑡(𝑗) − 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡(𝑗) − 𝜅𝐾𝑏2 (𝐾𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝐵𝑡(𝑗) − 𝑉𝑡)2 𝐾𝑡𝑏]}                     (7) 
where 𝜅𝐾𝑏 is the first-order derivative of a decreasing and convex function measuring 
the costs incurred by the bank when the ratio 𝐾𝑡𝑏(𝑗)/𝐵𝑡(𝑗) deviates from 𝑉𝑡. 
The assumption that banks have positive mass is key. Since banks are large (or 
non-atomistic), they take into account the impact of their loan rate policy on the 
aggregate variables. Therefore, the maximization takes place subject to the loan 
demand schedule, the bank’s balance sheet constraint, the working capital constraint, 
the interest rate rule and the macroprudential rule for the capital requirements. 
The solution to the union’s problem yields the optimal loan interest rate setting 
equation. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium and in log-linearized form (around the 
efficient steady state) 2 I obtain the expression3 
 
 ?̂?𝑡𝑏 = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝛯𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ + 𝑋𝑣?̂?                                                                                                              (8) 
 
 
where 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ ≡ ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡𝑏 is bank’s leverage. Note also the following elasticities   
 
 𝛯 ≡ 𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ = 𝑒𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑏(𝑙𝑒𝑣)2𝑟−1 − 𝛴𝑟 + (𝑙𝑒𝑣)2𝑘𝑘𝑏𝛴𝑣𝑒𝑏 − 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣) 𝑙𝑒𝑣                                    (9) 
    𝑋 ≡ 𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑑𝑣𝑡 = 𝑙𝑒𝑣3𝑘𝑘𝑏𝛴𝑣𝑒𝑏 − 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣)                                                                                             (10) 
 
Equation (8) can be interpreted as a positively sloped loan supply schedule. It 
shifts with changes in the policy rate, banks’ leverage and endogenous loan-to-capital 
ratio. Banks target an endogenous given leverage ratio and actively manage supply 
 
2 Variables in levels are denoted with capital letters, logged variables with small letters. Percentage 
deviations are denoted with small letters with a hat. 
3 This mechanism aims at replicating the stylized fact that banks adjust lending standards in response to 
their balance sheet conditions, tightening when capital constraints are binding and easing when, instead, 




conditions (i.e. loan rates) in order to bring this ratio back to the desired level whenever 
it deviates from it.   
The elasticity of policy rate to loan rate set by the z-bank is given by the 
following equation, with 𝑘 = (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝜃𝛽)/𝜃. 
𝛴𝑟 ≡ 𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑑𝜋𝑡 𝑑𝜋𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗) = 𝜑𝛱𝑘𝑛𝑧−1 > 0                                                                       (11) 
Large banks take into account the positive impact of their loan rate to marginal 
cost and the subsequent reaction of the monetary authority (increase of policy rate) to 
the inflationary pressure. The positive sign of 𝛴𝑟 is attributed to the presence of the 
cost channel. By relying to the traditional aggregate demand channel, Cuciniello and 
Signoretti (2015) find this elasticity to be negative. Note also that the real marginal cost 
is defined as 𝑚?̂?𝑡𝑟 = ?̂?𝑡𝑟 + 𝑛?̂?𝑡𝑏                                                                                                                                   (12) 
where the elasticity of marginal cost to loan rate variations is equal to 𝑛 ≡ 𝑑?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑟/𝑑?̂?𝑡𝑏 =𝑎𝜇𝑅/[𝑎𝜇𝑅 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑎)] and the real wage is ?̂?𝑡𝑟 = (𝜎 + 𝜑)?̂?𝑡. In our setting, the 
endogenous target leverage ratio is the reason d’être ofthe elasticity of the 
macroprudential instrument to z-bank’s loan rate 𝛴𝑣 and the parameter 𝜎−1 
represents the slope of the IS curve. 
𝛴𝑣 ≡ − 𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝑣𝑡 𝑑𝑣𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗) = −𝜒𝑣𝜎−1𝛴𝑟 < 0                                                               (13) 
Large banks internalize not only the reaction of the monetary but also those of 
the macroprudential authority. Thus, because of the countercyclical capital 
requirements, they anticipate that their loan interest rate increase trigger the reaction 
of the macroprudential authority by provoking recession into the economy (see 
equation 2).  
Another elasticity of interest is the elasticity of aggregate loan demand to the 
loan rate set by the representative bank 𝛴𝑏. Banks perceive loan pressure being driven 
by the economic slowdown as reducing the loan demand due to the working capital 
constraint.  
𝛴𝑏 ≡ − 𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝑏𝑡 𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗) = −[(𝜎 + 𝜑) − 1]𝜎−1𝛴𝑟 < 0                                        (14) 
Finally, 𝑒𝑏 represents the elasticity of loan demand to loan rate set by the z-bank 
𝑒𝑏 ≡ − 𝑑𝑏𝑡(𝑗)𝑑𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗) ⋅ 𝑟𝑡𝑏(𝑗)𝑏𝑡(𝑗) = 𝜀𝑏 (1 − 1𝑧) + 𝛴𝑏 < 0                                                (15) 
The first-order condition for banks has the same form as in the standard case 
with atomistic banks, i.e., ?̂?𝑡𝑏𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶 = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑟−1(𝑙𝑒𝑣)3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ + 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑟−1(𝑙𝑒𝑣)3?̂?𝑡 as the 
loan rate is set at a markup over bank’s leverage and leverage ratio. However, there is 
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one significant difference. The non-atomistic (large) banks case is characterized by the 
fact that these time-varying markups depend, through the aforementioned 
interactions between banks, monetary authority and macroprudential authority, on 
the degree of centralization of loan setting 𝑧−1, on the central bank’s aggressiveness in 
stabilizing inflation 𝜑𝛱, on the degree of credit distortion 𝑎, and on the degree of 
cyclicality of the macroprudential instrument 𝜒𝑣. It’s worth noticing that the 
dependences of the loan rate policy decisions on various characteristics of institutions 
are of vital importance to the model and drive our results; because of these, institutions 




In order to gain insights into the effects of large banks on the steady state, the 
determinacy conditions, and the dynamic properties, the results are illustrated by using 
a calibrated case. For the baseline case the number of firms is set at  𝑧 = 3. Table 1 





𝜃 Probability of not adjusting prices  0.75 Gali and Monacelli (2005) 𝜑 Inverse of the elasticity of labor supply  0.25 Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) 𝜎 Coefficient of risk aversion  2 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) 𝛽 Discount factor 0.99 Gali and Monacelli (2005) 𝜇𝑅 Steady state mark-up in loan market 0.03  Airaudo and Pia Olivero (2019) 
𝛼 Credit distortion 1 𝑎 ∈ (0, 1] 
𝑙𝑒𝑣 Bank’s leverage 0.1  Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) 𝑘𝑘𝑏 Bank capital adjustment cost curvature. 10 Gerali et al. (2010). 
 𝜀𝑏 , 𝜀 Elasticity of substitution across loan and 
goods varieties 
 6 Airaudo and Pia Olivero (2019) 
   𝜒𝑣 Reaction of macroprudential  
instrument to output 
 0.9 Angelini et al. (2011) 𝜑𝛱  Degree of anti-inflationary policy 1.5 Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) 
 
 
3. Steady state   
I focus on a zero inflation (𝛱 = 1) non-stochastic steady-state equilibrium. Without loss 
of generality, I follow Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) and I assume that in steady state 𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 𝑣 . Also, from the households Euler equation, I obtain the steady-state interest 




3.1 The steady- state credit mark-up 
 
Regarding the steady state credit mark-up in the presence of large banks, 𝜇𝑅 ≡ 𝑅𝑏𝑅−1, 
it is true that 𝜇𝑅 > 1 , that is a positive steady state credit spread, when 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣) <1. The latter is confirmed for plausible parameters values.  
Moreover, comparing the steady-state credit mark-up 𝜇𝑅 = [𝑒𝑏 − 𝛴𝑟(1 −𝑙𝑒𝑣)](𝑒𝑏 − 1)−1 with the one under monopolistic competition with atomistic banks, 𝜇𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑅 = 𝜀𝑏(𝜀𝑏 − 1)−1, it is found that the former is always bigger. Moreover, this 
difference appears to be more significant, the larger the 𝑒𝑏or the lower the 𝛴𝑟 . 
Figure 1 depicts graphically the relation between the steady-state level of the 
bank mark-up and the level of credit distortion (𝑎), under different assumptions 
regarding the number of banks, letting 𝑧 ∈ (3,5,10,30) 
 
FIGURE 1 




It is evident that the mark-up is negatively related to the level of credit 
distortion, 𝑎; As the credit constraint on firms is lessened (𝑎 is increased), 𝛴𝑟 is 
increased too and hence the financing costs. In addition, increased loan market 
concentration (low number of banks) is associated with high bank mark-up, for any 
given value of credit distortion. 
 
3.2 The steady- state output level 
 
It turns out that the strategic behavior of banks has an impact on the steady-state. 
Using the short-run aggregate supply, the marginal cost and the loan rate is 
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straightforward to prove that the steady state level of output, employment, and 
consumption is equal to  
𝑌 = 𝐶 = 𝐻 = [1 + 𝑎 1 − 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣)𝑒𝑏 − 1 ]− 1𝜑+𝜎                                                                  (16) 
                                                                                               
Looking at the steady state level of employment - equation (4)- I would like to 
stress some points. First, the steady state of the model is not Pareto efficient as the 
output efficient level is equal to 𝑌∗ = 𝐻∗ = 𝐶∗ = 1. The working capital needs create 
the need for financial intermediation which takes place under monopolistic 
competition (credit distortion 𝑎). Imperfect substitutability of loan types and 
intermediate goods as well as the presence of banks drive a wedge between the 
marginal productivity of labor and the marginal rate of substitution, determining a 
suboptimal employment and output equilibrium level. 
Second, as in Cuciniello and Signoretti (2015) under the presence of large banks 
the steady state depends on the monetary policy rule 𝜑𝛱. But, the novelty of our model 
is that this dependence is now a negative one.  This is due to the cost channel of 
monetary policy. Large banks are aware of the fact that an increase on their loan rate 
directly affects firms’ marginal cost and hence their price decisions. As a consequence, 
a more inflation-averse monetary authority provokes a bigger recession.  In addition, 
in our setting, a low credit constraint on firms (high value of α) leads to high value of 
the elasticity of marginal cost to loan rate variations  𝑛 ≡ 𝑎𝜇𝑅/[𝑎𝜇𝑅 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑎)]; 
thereby reducing 𝛴𝑟 and steady-state employment and output. This is in contrast to 
the standard case, where steady-state employment is positively related to credit 
constraint on firms (see equation 17). These considerations are summarized by the 
Proposition 1. 
 
PROPOSITION 1  
 
With large banks, Pareto inefficiency depends on the aggressiveness of the central bank 
in stabilizing inflation 𝜑𝛱,  the degree of loan setting centralization  𝑧−1, the steady 
state level of bank’s leverage 𝑙𝑒𝑣 , and the steady state mark-up 𝜇𝑅. 
 
The model, also, nests the cases of monopolistically and perfectly competitive 
banking sector. Letting the number of banks tend to infinity, employment, 
consumption, and output are back to monopolistic competition levels. 
                                           
𝑙𝑖𝑚  𝐻𝑧→∞ = 𝑙𝑖𝑚  𝑧→∞ {[1 + 𝑎 1 − 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣)𝑒𝑏  − 1 ]− 1𝜑+𝜎} = (1 + 𝑎𝑒𝑏  − 1)− 1𝜑+𝜎                (5)   
 
When indeed there are infinitely many banks, their mass tends to zero. As a 
consequence, the internalization effect channel is shut down and the degree of Pareto 
inefficiency depends on the degree of substitutability among loan types 𝑒𝑏 and the 
credit distortion 𝑎.  The perfect competition result arises instead when perfect 
substitutability among loan types is assumed, that is 
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 𝑙𝑖𝑚        𝑒𝑏→∞ 𝐻 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚        𝑒𝑏→∞ {[1 + 𝑎 (𝑒𝑏 − 𝛴𝑟(1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣)𝑒𝑏 − 1 − 1)]− 1𝜑+𝜎} = 1                              (18) 
                                                    
 
4. Determinacy analysis  
In the standard New Keynesian model, under an interest rate rule the monetary 
authority adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to changes in inflation. 
However, an interest rate rule can potentially lead to multiple equilibria, since inflation 
is endogenous. Furthermore, it is well known that in the presence of supply-side effects 
of monetary policy through the cost channel, the New Keynesian model is more prone 
to interdeterminacy issues. In this section, I investigate the properties of the 
equilibrium of the augmented with large banks New Keynesian model of the cost 
channel presented above. I derive the analytical conditions that prevent indeterminacy 
when the structure of the economy is purely forward-looking and the interest rate 
responds to current inflation4. In doing so, I highlight the significance of the 
internalization effect of large banks for the determinacy of the REE. 
The log-linearized (around the steady state), microfounded New Keynesian 
sticky price model of the business cycle augmented with a cost channel, large banks, 
monetary and macroprudential authority, consists of the following aggregate 
relationships: 
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡?̂?𝑡+1 + 𝑘(𝜎 + 𝜑)?̂?𝑡 + 𝑘𝑛?̂?𝑡𝑏                                                                                (6) 
( )
11
ˆˆ1ˆˆ ++ −−= tttttt EryEy 
                                                                                 (20) 
 ?̂?𝑡𝑏 = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝛯𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ + 𝛸𝑣𝑡                                                                                               (21) 
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝜑𝛱?̂?𝑡                                                                                                                   (22) 
 𝑣𝑡 = 𝜒𝑣?̂?𝑡                                                                                                                    (23) 
 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂ (≡ ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡𝑏) = −𝑁?̂?𝑡, where 𝑁 ≡ 𝜑 + 𝜎                                                   (24) 
 
Inflation dynamics are regulated by a Phillips curve (equation 19) augmented 
with a cost channel and the presence of large banks. With firms borrowing to pay for 
working capital, the interest rate of loans enters the Philips curve, revealing the role of 
the internalization effect on inflation. Hence, it turns out that in the context of the cost 
channel of monetary policy and under the presence of large banks, new factors drive 
 
4For determinacy, the number of eigenvalues of Γ1 (matrix of endogenous variables which are non-
predetermined) outside the unit circle must equal the number of non-predetermined endogenous 
variables (Blanchard and Kahn; 1980). 
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marginal cost and hence inflation. The dynamic IS curve is standard and given by 
equation (20). Also, an auxiliary equation for 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑡̂  is defined5. 
By using Woodford’s (2011) methodology for determination of necessary and 
sufficient condition of equilibrium, determinacy under a current-looking interest rate 
rule and in the presence of large banks, the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of a unique rational expectation equilibrium path converging to the steady 
state of the economy is 
  1 < 𝜑𝛱 < 2𝜎(1 + 𝛽) + 𝑘[(𝜎 + 𝜑) − 𝛯𝑁 + 𝑋𝜒𝑉]𝑘(𝜎 − 𝜑 + 𝛯𝑁 − 𝑋𝜒𝑉)                                                       (25) 
                                                                    
The case of a current inflation-targeting rule, when only the demand channel of 
monetary policy matters, has been previously analyzed by Bullard and Mitra (2002), 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) amongst others. In particular, for 𝑛 = 0 (there is no cost 
channel of monetary policy), monetary policy should be active and follow the standard 
Taylor Principle with no lower bound 𝜑𝛱 ∈ (1,  ∞). On the other hand, due to the 
borrowing constraint faced by firms, the Central Bank should be active and follow the 
standard Taylor Principle, with an upper bound on its responsiveness to inflation in the 
Taylor rule6. The reason for this is that increasing rates do not guarantee lower marginal 
costs. When the cost channel also matters an increasement in the policy rate not only 
impacts negatively on aggregate demand, but also has a positive impact on aggregate 
supply (Llosa and Tuesta 2009; Bruckner and Schabert; 2003).  
 
 1 < 𝜑𝛱,   𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶 < 2𝜎(1 + 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜎 + 𝜑)𝑘(𝜎 − 𝜑)                                                            (26) 
 
Comparing condition (25) with (26) provide us with interesting insights. In 
particular, in my model this upper bound is a negative function of the banks’ incentive 






A banking sector featuring aggressive large banks reduce the indeterminacy region, i.e., 




This study suggests the stabilization role of the banking institutions and reveals the 
implications of interactions among large banks, the monetary authority and the 
 
5 Using ?̂?𝑡𝑟 = (𝜑 + 𝜎)?̂?𝑡  into the log-linearized liquidity-in-advance-constraint yields ?̂?𝑡 = (1 + 𝜑 +𝜎)?̂?𝑡. Moreover, the cash-in-advance-constraint can be written as ?̂?𝑡 = (𝜑 + 𝜎)?̂?𝑡. Replacing the last 
two equations into the log-linearized balance sheet constraint, equation (6) yields equation (24). 
6 As long as 𝜎 > 𝜑  the cost channel dominates the demand channel of monetary generating an upper 
bound on interest rate. 
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macroprudential authority in business cycle stabilization. Earlier contributions on 
monetary policymaking in the presence of cost channel do not investigate these 
interactions.  
In particular, it is shown that under the presence of large banks, the way in 
which the central bank and the macroprudential authority systematically behaves, the 
severity of the firms’ credit constraints, the degree of loan rate setting centralization, 
have an impact on the long-run equilibrium of the model and on the determinacy of 
the rational expectations equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the recent experience implies that negative policy rates have 
become part of the central banker’s toolbox, and calls into question the relevance of 
the zero-lower bound (ZLB). Following the crisis of 2008, several central banks engaged 
in a new experiment by setting negative policy rates. Understanding how the 
introduction of these interactions between (large) banks and the macroeconomic 
authorities alter the optimal implementation of monetary policy in such a low interest 
rate environment is worth of further efforts in the literature.   
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